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ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Under the Virginia "triggerman rule," when the offenses consti-
tuting the charge of capital murder are the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of a person in the commission of robbery armed with
a deadly weapon, or while in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape,
a defendant may not be convicted of capital murder unless the Common-
wealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the
actual perpetrator of the murder. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
146, 149, 255 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1979), cert. denied 454 U.S. 920 (1981).
Contrary to normal rules of accomplice liability, neither an accessory
before the fact nor a principal in the second degree may be so convicted.
Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599 (1990).
In Cheng, three individuals participated in the robbery and fatal
shooting of the victim. The evidence did not suggest, however, that more
than one person shot the victim. The supreme court reversed the trial
court's conviction of Cheng for capital murderbecause it held that the jury
could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Cheng was the
triggerman.
Like Cheng, Rogers was admittedly a participant in the incident,
but as the court points out, "[t]he significant weakness in the
Commonwealth's case is the lack of any evidence, direct or circumstan-
tial, which places the murder weapon in defendant's hands." Rogers, 242
Va. at 319, 410 S.E.2d at 628. Accordingly, the jury could not have
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Rogers was the triggerman.
While a defendant may be found to be the triggerman based
entirely upon circumstantial evidence, such circumstantial evidence
only may be used "provided it is of such convincing character as to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the accused is guilty.
Dukes v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 313 S.E.2d 382 (1984). Thus,
"[sluspicion of guilt, however strong, or even a probability of guilt, is
insufficient to support a conviction." Cheng, 240 Va. at 42, 393 S.E.2d
at 608.
In the instant case, the court acknowledged that there is indeed, a
"probability that the defendant was the criminal agent in the victim's
death." Rogers, 242 Va. at 320, 410 S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added).
However, "all necessary circumstances must be consistent with guilt, must
be inconsistent with innocence, and must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence. [...] Because the circumstances of defendant's
conduct do not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Troy Malcolm
killed the victim, the capital murder prosecution fails." Id.
Where the evidence suggests the possibility ofjoint perpetration of
acts causing death, the Virginia Supreme Court has departed from a strict
interpretation of the triggerman rule. In Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241
Va. 482,404 S.E.2d 227 (1991), and in Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 243,257 S.E.2d 797 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980), the
court upheld capital murder convictions based upon theories of joint
participation. In Coppola, the co-defendants each repeatedly assaulted the
victim, causing her death. In Strickler, the co-defendants killed the victim
by crushing her skull with a sixty-nine pound rock. Partly because of the
very specific circumstances which made it feasible to believe that two
people would have been needed to hold the victim and drop the rock, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that it was immaterial whether Strickler held
the victim down or pummeled her with the rock because the evidence
showed that the victim's death was caused by one indivisible act perpe-
trated by two individuals. See case summary of Strickler v. Common-
wealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p.2 2 (1991).
Cheng, Strickler, and Rogers indicate that except in murder forhire
cases, where the evidence does not suggest joint participation in acts
causing death, both co-defendants may not be convicted of capital murder.
In cases where the evidence is arguably less than prima facie that a
particular defendant caused death, the issue may be raised pretrial by a
motion to dismiss the capital indictment. If the issue is determined to be
a jury question, care should be taken to preserve it clearly on the record.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Mclnemey
GEORGE v. COMMONWEALTH
242 Va. 264, 411 S.E.2d 12 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Michael Carl George was convicted of capital murder in the
commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-31(4). Upon a finding of "future dangerousness" and
"vileness," the jury set George's penalty at death, which was accepted by
the trial court.
On June 16, 1990 at approximately 2:00 p.m., fifteen-year-old
Alexander Eugene Sztanko was last seen alive by his parents when he rode
his motorcycle away from his family's house to nearby woods. Approxi-
mately one hour to half an hour later, Alex's father heard two gunshots
which originated from the woods. The next day, Corporal Joseph Dillon
of the Prince William County Police Department noticed a blue Ford
Bronco in the woods near Alex's house. Aware that Alex had been
reported missing and that he had seen the same vehicle at the same location
the day before, Corporal Dillon ran a license check of the Bronco and found
that it was registered to George. Shortly thereafter, Corporal Dillon
observed a camouflaged person who "appear[ed] ... that he did not want
to be seen." George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 269 (1991). This
person identified himself as George and stated that he was in the area to find
a hunting ground. In a conversation with Dillon, George admitted that he
had been in the same area the day before. Once another police unit arrived,
officer Dillon arrested George for trespassing.
Once George was in custody and transferred away, "Dillon
walked to the spot where George had knelt down." Id. at 269. There,
officer Dillon found Alex's tennis shoes. After a more thorough search
of the area, the police discovered Alex's shoeless body. The police also
recovered Alex's motorcycle and helmet and determined that they were
found approximately five-tenths of mile from where the body had lain.
Alex died instantaneously of a single gunshot wound to the head.
In addition, the autopsy revealed abrasions of Alex's penis which were
consistent with an "electrical burning." Id. at 269-270. The autopsy also
revealed "the presence of seminal fluid." Id. at 270. "Fibers found on
Alex's T-shirt were consistent with the material from ... George's
camouflage jacket." Id. An examination of George's clothing revealed
blood "inconsistent with his blood type but consistent with Alex's." Id.
Police searches of George, his vehicle, and his parents' home led
to the discovery of a topographical map marking where the victim's body
and motorcycle plus helmet were found, a stun gun, and a fully loaded
nine millimeter pistol determined to be the murder weapon.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld George's conviction of
capital murder in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly
weapon, and affirmed his sentence at death. George assigned numerous
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errors. Some of these the court treated conclusively. Others did not
involve death penalty law or are unlikely to arise often because they
revolve around facts peculiar to the case. Issues which will not be
discussed in this summary include: the denial of motions to suppress a
statement made to a police officer and evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant, change of venue, juror exclusion, evidence relating to a
stun gun, an amendment of indictment for abduction, adequacy of
discovery and bill of particulars,jury instructions, and a sentence review
for excessiveness and disproportionality. Many issues were properly
preserved for appeal, having been decided on their merits at trial and on
appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. Others, such as a sentence review
for passion and prejudice were held by the Virginia Supreme Court to be
defaulted due to the fact that George did not object at trial. This case
summary will address George's Ake claim, the relevance of animal
cruelty to "future dangerousness," the scope of "in commission of
robbery," the relevance of "aggravation" evidence, and the fact that the
mandatory review of death sentence under Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 can
not be defaulted.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Issues Summarily Dismissed
The court summarily dismissed several of George's claims under
the heading "ISSUES PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED," which briefly
cited holdings of its earliercases respecting certain claims. Itis important
to note that these claims are preserved for federal review. Some of these
claims, as well as others more fully addressed by the court, are discussed
below.
A. Ake Claim
In Ake v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court held,
[Wihen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that
his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant
factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist .... We
leave to the State the decision on how to implement this
right.
470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). In frequently cited text, the Court added,
We recognize long ago that mere access to the courthouse
doors does notby itself assure a proper functioning of the
adversary process, and that a criminal trial is fundamen-
tally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent
defendant without making certain that he has access to the
raw materials integral to the building of an effective
defense ... we have focused on identifying the 'basic
tools of an adequate defense or appeal' ... and we have
required that such tools be provided to those defendants
who cannot afford to pay for them.
Ake 470 U.S. at 77. Since Ake, subsequent cases have held Ake to apply
not only to psychiatrists but also expert witnesses and expert investigators.
In George, the court summarily dismissed the defendant's re-
quest for an expert investigator and his request for funds to employ an
expert witnesses by citing its previous cases under "ISSUES PREVI-
OUSLY RESOLVED" without applying this prior case law to the
specific facts of his case. George,242Va.at271. Each request requires
a specific showing by the defendant that the expert requested is a "basic
tool" of his defense in his circumstances and, therefore, arguably require
fact-specific determinations by the court. George argued that the trial
court's denial of his requests constituted adenial of dueprocess and equal
protection. By citing its cases without applying them to the specific facts
of his case, the court, in essence, stated the law but did not address the
particular showings made by George, as Ake and its progeny require.
Thus, even though the law is "previously resolved," these claims should
not have been resolved until the court decided them based upon the merits
of the individual case.
B. Relevance of "Future Dangerousness" Evidence
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the admission of evidence of animal
cruelty by the defendant at the sentencing phase of the trial. Althoughthis
behavior occurred twenty years ago and "may have had emotional
aspects," the court stated, "[i]t is essential in determining the probability
of a defendant's future criminal conduct 'that the jury have before it all
possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose
fate it must determine."' 242 Va. at 273 (quotingJ. Watkins v. Common-
wealth, 229 Va. 469, 487, 331 S.E.2d 422, 436 (1985)(citations omit-
ted)). As for the passage of twenty years, the court stated, "twenty years
affected only the weight to be afforded the evidence, not its admissibil-
ity." Id. It is important to note that this issue was properly preserved
because the defendant made a pretrial motion in limine to exclude
evidence of animal cruelty from the sentencing phase of trial. This
motion is on the record for further appeal and was not raised on appeal
merely as part of the larger issue of whether or not there was sufficient
evidence of "future dangerousness." There may be other cases where a
similar motion in limine will be granted by the trial court or, if denied,
will be held to contribute to a cumulative finding of a constitutional
violation on appeal.
C. Scope of "in Commission of Robbery"
The court considered certain circumstantial evidence to deter-
mine whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to allow the jury
to draw the inference that George had committed a murder in the
commission of a robbery. Such evidence included a statement that
George made to a cellmate, while incarcerated awaiting trial, that he
stopped Alex, grabbed him, dragged him off his bike back into the woods
to have sex with him, sodomized him, stunned him in his genitals, and
shot him in his head. 242 Va. at 270. The evidence also showed that a
group of people, who were in the woods the evening of Alex's murder,
found the victim's motorcycle and helmet, took them joyriding, and,
upon learning of Alex's murder, turned them over to the police. There
was also evidence that the victim carried two twenty-dollar bills in his
wallet.
George claimed that "there was absolutely no evidence that
robbery ever occurred" and the evidence was, therefore, insufficient to
convict him of capital murder in the commission of robbery while armed
with a deadly weapon under Va. CodeAnn. § 18.2-31(4). Id. at 277. The
Commonwealth argued "that George had robbed his victim of his wallet,
the two twenty-dollar bills kept therein, his shoes, his motorcycle, and his
helmet." Id. The court held, "[w]e need not decide whether the evidence
was sufficient to establish robbery involving the victim's wallet, money,
and shoes. We think the evidence clearly establishes robbery with
respect to Alex Sztanko's motorcycle and helmet." Id. The fact that the
jury may not have given sufficient weight to the motorcycle and helmet
evidence and may have given weight to the wallet, money, and shoe
evidence was found to be irrelevant. Citing Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398,420-421 (1970), the court added, "when [a] jury returns a guilty
verdict on indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, the verdict
stands if evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged;
status of case with respect to other allegations is irrelevant to validity of
conviction." Id.
In Virginia, robbery is defined under the common law "as the
taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his
person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation."
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Id. at 277 (emphasis added). The court found that "[c]onsidering all the
circumstances present in this case and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence," George "harbored the intention both to molest
Alex sexually and to steal his motorcycle and helmet." Id. at 279-280.
The court was convinced that "George... removed the motorcycle and
helmet from the trail and hid them, planning to return later and retrieve
his bounty" because of the circumstances surrounding the murder;
because he returned to the scene of the crime the day after the murder;
because he had a topographical map marking where the evidence was
found; and because there was circumstantial evidence that he had moved
the motorcycle and helmet five-tenths of a mile away from where the
victim's body was discovered. Id. at 278-280.
Citing Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 855-56 (1981),
the court stated, "[m]urder in the commission of robbery is a killing
which takes place before, during, or after the robbery and is so closely
related thereto in time, place, and causal connection as to make the
killing part of the same criminal enterprise as the robbery." George,
242 Va. at 278 (emphasis added). Although George was arrested in the
area of the murder when he went to "retrieve his bounty" approximately
twenty hours after the victim's murder, the court held that "the evidence
supports the finding that the murder and robbery of Alex Sztanko were
parts of the same criminal enterprise and that George was motivated by
the dual purpose of molesting Alex sexually and robbing him." Id. at 280
(emphasis added). The fact that George returned approximately twenty
hours later was seen as a continuation of the intent to steal and not as an
attempt to destroy evidence related to the murder. In George, the court
affirms that it will allow ajury's finding of murder in the commission of
a robbery whenever the evidence supports such a finding, even if drawn
from inferences that suggest that the taking and killing are separated by
a period of twenty hours.
D. Relevance of "Aggravation" Evidence
George claimed that there were grounds for a mistrial because,
during closing arguments for the guilt and innocence phase of the
capital murder charge which was also the sentencing phase for three
non capital charges under Virginia law, the prosecutor argued for the
maximum penalty for the noncapital convictions and noted the loss to
the community and victim's family from the victim's death. His claim
was based upon Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Booth and Gathers held
that victim impact evidence could not be introduced or argued in the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. See case summary of South
Carolina v. Gathers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 5 (1991).
In Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court held that victim impact evidence introduced at the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial does not violate the eighth
amendment's guarantee against imposing death sentences based on
arbitrary factors unrelated to defendant's culpability. This holding
overruled the constitutional protection of Booth and Gathers. See case
summary of Payne v. Tennessee, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1,
p. 14 (1991). However, the Court did state," [a] State may legitimately
conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the
murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to
whether or not the death penalty should be imposed." Payne, 111 S.Ct.
at 2609 (emphasis added). Thus, Payne removed the federal constitu-
tional barrier prohibiting the introduction of impact evidence at the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial and leaves the question of
whether or not to do so to each state.
In Virginia, in capital murder cases, there is no statutory law
which permits victim impact evidence. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-299.1
specifically exempts capital murder cases from its provisions requiring
or permitting preparation of a victim impact report. The statute does not
directly address the issue of prosection argument or evidence at a capital
penalty trial. The relevance of capital penalty trial evidence is governed
by the Commonwealth's burden at that stage to prove one or both of the
two statutory aggravating factors of "vileness" and "future dangerous-
ness." These factors relate only to increased individual culpability of
defendant's for sentencing. Likewise, case law reaffirms Dingus v.
Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S.E.2d 414 (1929) which specifically
disfavors reference to a victim's family.
In George, the Virginia Supreme Court felt the issue was
"[w]hether it was improper for the prosecutor to argue for punishment on
the non-capital offenses that took into account Alex Sztanko's human
qualities and the impact of his death," and correspondingly held, "the
argument was not improper." George, 242 Va. at 282. However, the
essence of George's argument was that the prosecutor's statements
during the penalty phase of the non-capital convictions, occurring
simultaneously as the guilt and innocence phase of his capital murder
offenses, created a mistrial error. Booth and Gathers did not purport to
forbid victim impact evidence or argument in non-capital cases.
George does not decide the question of whether or not Virginia
will follow Payne now that it is constitutionally free to do so. The court
did, however refer to the fact that George's argument was based upon
Booth and Gathers and that Payne had overruled these cases. This may
signal a willingness by the court to reinterpret Virginia law once the issue
is squarely presented. The definitive answer, however, must wait for
another day.
E. Mandatory Review of Death Sentence Under
Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 Can Not Be Defaulted
Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1, Review of a Death Sentence, states,
"[a] sentence of death, upon the judgement thereon becoming final in the
circuit court, shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court," and
adds, "the court shall consider and determine... [w]hether the sentence
of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor." This is a state-created right, separate from the
right of appeal in capital cases. See Konrad, How to Look the Virginia
Gift Horse in The Mouth: FederalDue Process and Virginia's Arbitraiy
Abrogation of Capital Defendant's State-Created Rights, Capital De-
fense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 16 (1991). George claimed a verdict
influenced by passion or prejudice in part because a charge of abduction
with intent to defile was consolidated for trial with the capital murder
charge. The court refused to consider this, apparently holding the issue
defaulted because George did not object to consolidation at trial. This is
error, arguably amounting to arbitrary administration of the state created
right to mandatory review, because the court is obligated to review the
entire record, regardless of defaults. This obligation would exist even if
there had been no appeal. Appellate counsel may and does draw the
court's attention to factors deemed to be relevant to passion and preju-
dice. The court is obligated to consider them all.
